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RECENT ILLINOIS CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-VENUE-WHETHER

OR NOT PROVISIONS OF STATUTE

REGULATING CHANGE OF VENUE APPLY TO MOTION IN NATURE OF WRIT OF

procedural point of some slight interest, presented
to the Illinois Supreme Court through the medium of the case of People v.
Sheppard,' arose as the result of the filing of a motion in the nature of a
writ of error coram nobis by a convicted defendant who was seeking a
new trial. The defendant had been indicted, tried, convicted, and had
had his conviction affirmed on writ of error.2 He thereafter presented his
motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court,
which motion was assigned to the same judge who had presided over the
original trial. Defendant then sought a change of venue on the ground of
prejudice on the part of the trial judge, asserting it to be a mandatory duty
resting upon such judge to grant his request either by reason of Section 18
of the Venue Act, applicable to criminal proceedings, or under Section 1
3
of the same statute, if the proceeding was to be deemed civil in nature.
Both the request for change of venue and the motion in the nature of a
writ of error coram nobis were denied,4 and these rulings were sustained
when the Supreme Court held that the provisions for change of venue were
inapplicable to proceedings in the nature of error coram nobis. Although
the precise question had not previously been decided in this state, the court
had little trouble in attaining a solution without searching for precedent.
As the purpose of both the common law writ of error coram nobis 5 and of its
modern counterpart under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act" was to
present to the court which rendered judgment facts which were not placed
in evidence at the original trial but which would have necessarily altered
the decision if they had been presented, it would logically follow that only
the court rendering the judgment should pass on the point as it alone
would realize the full significance of such new facts. It was, therefore,
said that to require the granting of a request for change of venue would
ERROR CORAm NOBIS-A

1405 Il. 79, 90 N. E. (2d) 78 (1950).

See People v. Sheppard, 402 I1. 411, 84 N. E. (2d) 377 (1949).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, §§ 1 and 18.
4 The state moved to dismiss the motion, which had been filed pursuant to Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196, on the ground that it did not state facts
within the purview of the statute but more nearly sought a review of evidence
previously introduced.
5 See State ex rel. Emmert v. Gentry, 223 Ind. 535, 62 N. E. (2d) 860, 161 A. L. R.
532 (1945); 49 C. J. S., Judgments, § 316; Black, Judgments, Vol. 1, § 300;
Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 1, p. 224.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
2
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serve to defeat the very purpose for which the writ of error coram nobis
was created. There may be some occasion to consider, however, that if a
full assimilation has not occurred between Section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act and other related statutes, further legislative action, at least in this
instance, might be desirable.
EVIDENCE-WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENcY-DEGREE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING SURVIVAL NECESSARY TO TAKE CASE OUT FROM OPERATION OF

UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATa AcT-In the recent case of Prudential

Insurance Company of America v. Spain,1 the Appellate Court for the
Fourth District delivered an opinion which required that interpretation
be given to certain clauses of the Illinois statute modelled on the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act.2 The suit was in the nature of an interpleader
action brought by an insurance company to determine the rightful person
entitled to receive the proceeds of four insurance policies. Two of the
policies had been issued on the life of a man, the other two on the life
of his wife, each insured naming the other as beneficiary. Both the
husband and wife were killed as the result of a collision between their
car and a train. Immediately following the collision, two members of
the train crew, by observation and other lay investigation, came to
the conclusion that the husband was dead, but that the wife, although
dying, was still alive. The wife's estate claimed the proceeds of the
four policies, while the husband's estate, asserting the applicability of
the statute in question, 3 argued that, as there was no "sufficient evidence"
that the husband predeceased the wife, the funds should go severally
to the estates of the insured parties.' At the trial of the interpleader
action, the wife's estate had the benefit of the train crew's testimony
1339 Ill. App. 476, 90 N. E. (2d) 256 (1950).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 192.1-4. The statute, first enacted in -1941,
was based on a proposed Uniform Simultaneous Death Act: Unif. Laws Anno.,
Vol. 9, p. 659 et seq. Some thirty-eight states have adopted the uniform law or
some variation thereof: Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 9, 1950 supp., p. 252.
3 Section 1 of the uniform law, identical with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
§ 192.1, reads: "Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends
upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have
died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed
of as If he had survived, except as otherwise provided in this article."
4 Section 4 of the uniform law, also enacted in Illinois, declares: "Where the
insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident Insurance have died,
and there is no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously, the proceeds of the policies shall be distributed as if the insured had
survived the beneficiary." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 192.4. While
the uniform statute generally was designed to abrogate certain artificial presumptions, the retention of an arbitrary presumption as to life Insurance contracts was deemed appropriate as most nearly approximating the intention of the
real party In interest, i. e. the insured: Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Unif. Laws
Anno., Vol. 9, pp. 657-8.
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while the husband's estate relied on expert testimony to the effect that
death could be determined only by the use of a stethoscope. The judgment of the trial court awarded the proceeds of all four policies to the
wife's estate and, on appeal, that judgment was affirmed.
The Appellate Court, when determining that the testimony of the
members of the train crew was "sufficient evidence" to take the case
out of the operation of the Simultaneous Death Act, reached that conclusion on the basis that the phrase "no sufficient evidence" appearing in the statute did not change the rule that a preponderance of
evidence is usually enough to prove a particular fact, including the
fact of the time of death. Since this would appear to be the first time that
this particular phrase has been passed upon, in Illinois or elsewhere,
the actual effect of this decision is of interest. Prior to the adoption
of the statute, there was, in cases of common disaster, no presumption
of survivorship in Illinois, so survivorship, like any other fact, had
to be proven by a preponderance of competent evidence? Under the
interpretation now given to the statute, the evidentiary requirements
set forth in earlier decisions have not been changed in any respect. A
mere preponderance of evidence tending to prove that one party survived
the other will, therefore, suffice to by-pass the operation of the statute.
That result would appear to be proper inasmuch as the statute was
intended to operate, and by the instant case has been limited in its
operation, to cases where there is no evidence whatever of survivorshipA
INJUNCTION-SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND RELIEF-WHETHER OR NOT

EQUITY MAY GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST A PENDING CASE WHEN
THE

PETITIONER

MIGHT

HAVE

ACCOMPLISHED

THE

SAME

RESULT

BY

AN

ACTIoN-The plaintifflessee, in Bartelstein v. Goodman,' sought an injunction to prevent prosecution, by the defendant-lessor, of a forcible detainer action then pendEQUITABLE

DEFENSE ASSERTED

ing in another court.

IN

THE PENDING

The complaint charged an attempt by the lessor

wrongfully to terminate the lease on the basis of an alleged default
under a covenant to keep a theater building and its improvements in
first class condition and to make special repairs. Plaintiff alleged that
the true reason for default, if there was one, lay in the lessor's procrastination over approving certain proposed changes; that the lessor
5 Modern Woodmen of America v. Parido, 335 Ill. 239, 167 N. E. 52 (1929). Lay
testimony concerning death is competent evidence, according to In re Herrman,
75 Misc. 599, 136 N. Y. S. 944 (1912), affirmed in In re Laffargue's Estate, 155
App. Div. 923, 140 N. Y. S. 743 (1913).
The last mentioned case closely approximates the instant one in factual content, but no uniform statute had been proposed at the time of that decision.
0 See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 9, p. 657.
1 340 Il. App. 51, 90 N. E. (2d) 796 (1950).
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had possession of a deposit more than ample to indemnify against any
alleged injury; and that the only objective of the forcible detainer action
was to accomplish a forfeiture of the lease. The defendant-lessor, by
suitable motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 2 argued that since
the plaintiff might have interposed an equitable defense to the forcible
detainer action' the remedy at law was "adequate" and there was
no reason for equity to take jurisdiction. Upon denial of that motion, plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction against further prosecution of the law action. On appeal therefrom, the Appellate Court for
the First District affirmed the holding.
While it has been held that an equitable defense may be submitted
for consideration in a forcible detainer action,4 it does not necessarily
follow that a court of equity is precluded from giving relief to prevent
forfeitures when proper circumstances warrant equitable interference.
The Civil Practice Act does not alter the equitable character of matters
heretofore within the cognizance of a court of equity,5 nor have substantial
distinctions between actions at law and suits in chancery been abolished.6
In two previous cases, decided since the adoption of the Civil Practice
Act, appellate courts in Illinois have approved injunctions restraining
the prosecution of forcible detainer suits,7 but it does not appear that
the adequacy of the legal remedy was there put in issue. Now that
the point has been directly raised, the present adjudication acknowledges
the power of a court of equity to enjoin the prosecution of a forcible
detainer action despite the fact that the plaintiff seeking equitable relief
might have used the same matter as an equitable defense in the action
restrained. Since Section 44 of the Civil Practice Act is cast in permissive terms rather than mandatory ones,8 the outcome of the instant
case would seem to be eminently correct. The choice being one belonging to the defendant, the plaintiff in the law action should not be allowed
to dictate how that choice is to be exercised.
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(b).
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 168. That section is applicable in forcible detainer
actions, originally excluded from the operation of the Civil Practice Act under
Ch. 110, § 125, by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11, which calls for
uniformity in procedure except where special statutory regulation exists.
4 See Northern Trust Co. v. Watson, 310 Ill. App. 263, 33 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941),
and Coyne v. South Shore DeLuxe Laundry, 299 Ill. App. 275, 20 N. E. (2d) 117
(1939). But see State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 283 Ill. App. 337 (1936),
criticized in 25 Ill. B. J. 79. The same rule applies to ejectment actions according
to Horner v. Jamieson, 394 Ill. 222, 68 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946), noted In 25
CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 232.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.10.
6 See Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N. E. (2d) 424 (1941).
7 Kahn v. Loeffler, 339 Ill. App. 276, 89 N. E. (2d) 749 (1950) ; Waukegan Times
Theater Corp. v. Conrad, 324 Ill. App. 622, 59 N. E. (2d) 308 (1945).
s IlL. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Oh. 110, § 168, states: ". . . the defendant may set
up in his answer any and all cross-demands whatever, whether in the nature of
S.. cross-bill In equity or otherwise."
Italics added.
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INSURANC-THE CONTRACT IN GENERAI--WHETHER IT Is POSSIBLE TO
CONSTRUE AN EXTENDED COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT ON A FIRE POLICY SO AS

TO ALLOW THE INSURED TO RECOVER THE FACE AMOUNT THEREOF FOR EACH
PERIL COVERED WHEN Two OR MORE LOSSES OCCUR INVOLVING DIFFERENT

RisKs-Construction of an extended coverage endorsement on a fire policy
became necessary in the case of Oller v. New York Fire Insirance Company,' a case which takes on significance in that it represents the first time
that the highly standardized endorsement in question has been subject to
construction in this state. The plaintiff there concerned took out a fire
policy with the defendant on which he later obtained extended coverage
by way of endorsement. The endorsement provided, among other things,
for the additional perils covered, one of which was loss by windstorm;
declared that the amount of the insurance was not increased; stipulated
that the additional perils would be substituted for the word "fire" in
the policy when the case required; and recited that the endorsement was
to form part of the policy. While the policy was in effect, the plaintiff
suffered a windstorm loss which amounted to a sum less than the face
amount of the policy, and was paid for such loss. Subsequently, a fire
loss occurred which exceeded the amount of the policy. Upon defendant's
refusal to pay more than the difference between the face of the policy and
the windstorm loss already paid, plaintiff brought action for the full
amount of the policy. Plaintiff succeeded in the trial court, apparently
on the theory that the policy and the endorsement constituted two severable contracts and for the additional reason that under the "substitution
of terms" clause the plaintiff could substitute each added peril for the
word "fire" in the policy itself, thereby insuring against each peril up
to the face amount of the policy. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Fourth District reversed on the ground that the endorsement prohibited increasing the amount of insurance, that there was but one contract, and that the endorsement did nothing more than extend its protection to the added perils. The court refused to apply the familiar rule
of construction that ambiguities should be construed most favorably to
the assured 2 because no ambiguity was said to exist. The rider in question
must be understood to provide for no more than one sum of protection
equivalent to the face of the policy, regardless of the peril or combination
of perils which may cause loss, unless the policy be reinstated in full upon
payment of an additional premium after compensation in part has been
made.
1 339 Ill. App. 461, 90 N. E. (2d) 241 (1950).
2 Joseph v. New York Ins. Co., 308 11. 93, 139 N. E. 32 (1923).
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JOINT STOCK COMPANIES AND BUSINESS TRUSTS--OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES-WHETHER OR NOT A LIQUIDATION TRUST MANAGER MAY BE COMPELLED TO ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS REALIZED FROM OPEN MARKET PURCHASES
1
OF TRUST

CERTIFICATES-The recent case of Victor v. Hilebrecht repre-

sents the first enunciation in Illinois concerning the right of trust managers of liquidation trusts to purchase beneficial participation certificates of the trust and retain the profits realized by such purchases. The
trust agreement there concerned had been executed pursuant to a plan
2
of reorganization instituted under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
and was designed to produce an orderly liquidation of the trust res, a
large apartment hotel. The trust managers were, by the agreement, authorized to submit, within their discretion, suitable offers for the sale
of the trust res to the certificate holders and such offers were to be considered as accepted unless the holders of at least one-third of the outstanding certificates filed a written dissent within a specified time. The
trust agreement provided that the trust managers could be holders of
beneficial certificates showing participation in the trust and recognized
the right of other holders to deal freely with the trust managers. The
trust managers, for their own account, accumulated about fourteen per
cent. of the total of outstanding units, part being obtained in exchange
for bonds at the time of reorganization, but the major portion being
acquired by subsequent purchases from a brokerage house which maintained an active market in the certificates. The value of the trust certificates having become enhanced by reason of higher bids for the trust res,
certain of the beneficial certificate holders, who had not disposed of any
of their certificates, brought an equitable action against the trust manager seeking, among other things, to compel an accounting of the profits
realized by the defendants by reason of such purchases. The chancellor
dismissed the suit for want of equity. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court
for the First District reversed. The Supreme Court, however, after granting leave to appeal, reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the decree
of the chancellor.
In arriving at that decision, the Supreme Court deemed it highly significant that none of the plaintiffs had sold any part of their original
holdings, either to the trust managers directly or upon the open market,
1405 Ill. 264, 90 N. E. (2d)
(2d) 270 (1950).
211 U. S. C. A. 1207.

751 (1950),

reversing 339 Ill. App. 254, 90 N. E.
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for which reason it could not be claimed that they had been injured by
the purchase transactions.3 On the contrary, it appeared that the plaintiffs were in a position to gain proportionately with the trust managers
as the trust res appreciated in value. Plaintiffs, however, had relied on
the familiar general rule which requires loyalty on the part of trustees
and forbids secret dealing with the trust property.4 That rule was held
inapplicable to the instant case as the defendants were said not to possess
any control over the sale of the trust units and other certificate holders
were under no disability regarding the disposition of their interests to the
defendants. Although there is much to be said for the view adopted by
the Supreme Court in the instant case, keeping in mind the provisions of
the trust agreement, it should be recognized that such a holding could lead
to dangerous consequences, particularly if the trust managers should, by
purchase or consolidation with others, acquire enough strength to block
a liquidation. If that situation ever developed, the court would probably
be inclined to investigate the bona fides of purchases made by the trust
managers despite the apparent sanction of the trust agreement.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORTS-WHETHER

OR NOT GENERAL

STAT-

UTE REQUIRING THE GIVING OF NOTICE TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF FACT

OF INJURY APPLIES TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER STATUTE FOR SUPPRESSION

OF MOB VIOLENCE--A problem of statutory integration grew out of the
recent case of Kennedy v. City of Chicago' wherein the plaintiff sought
to recover damages, for injury suffered by mob violence, from the municipal corporation because of its failure to suppress a riot.2 At the ensuing trial, plaintiff gave no proof of notice to the municipal corporation
of the type customarily given as a condition precedent to other tort
actions' but, instead, took the position that no notice was required in mob
violence cases since the particular statute imposed no such requirement.4
3 For an analogous situation wherein a selling shareholder was permitted to sue
a purchasing director, see Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E. (2d)
630 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 272.
4 Kinney v. Lindgren, 373 Il1. 415, 26 N. E. (2d) 471 (1940),
App. 610, 21 N. E. (2d) 332 (1939).

reversing 300 Iii.

1340 Ill. App. 100, 91 N. E. (2d) 138 (1950).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 512 et seq.
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11. It appeared from the statement of the case that
a notice had been served l)rior to suit but such notice was defective for failure
to include the residence address of plaintiff. Another notice, served after suit
had been begun but within six months of the injury, one designed to correct the
omission in the first notice, was excluded under the authority of City of Waukegan
v. Sharaflnski, 135 Ill. App. 436 (1907).

4 It was argued that the legislature, by its silence on the point, had indicated
a deliberate purpose to omit such requirement at the time of enacting the personal
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The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor as to such contention and granted
plaintiff a judgment against the municipality. That judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and the cause was
remanded with a direction to dismiss the suit, when it came to the conclusion that, by proper integration, it was necessary to read into the mob
violence statute those provisions, noted above, to be found in the later
general Cities and Villages Act, which provisions make notice an essential
element in all personal injury cases.' That conclusion was reached on
the basis that (1) the general provision was all-inclusive, except as to
cases coming under other special statutory regulation,6 and (2) the special provision in the property damage statute was necessary not so much
to show an intention to excuse the giving of notice in personal injury
cases growing out of riot as to conform the practice in property damage
cases to that followed in other suits against municipalities. That rationale
becomes the more evident when it is remembered that the general statute
relates to cases based solely on injury to the person and has no application to property damage cases. As the later general provisions are so
7
worded as to be all-inclusive, both as to notice and period of limitation,
the result achieved would appear to be an inevitable consequence of the
necessary integration of statutory materials. The fact that such materials
are distributed between civil and criminal statutes was deemed to be a
matter of no moment.8

injury by mob violence statute, Laws 1909, p. 190, Ill.Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch.
38, § 512 et seq., on the basis that specific provision for notice had been inserted
in a prior law relating to damage to property caused by riot: Laws 1887, p. 237,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 518 et seq., particularly § 523.
5 A motion by defendant for a directed verdict must be granted if there has been
a failure to give notice: McCarthy v. City of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 268, 38 N. E.
(2d) 519 (1941).
An interesting sidelight concerning the applicability of notice
provisions to minor plaintiffs appears in Martin v. School Board of Union Free
Dist. No. 28. - N. Y. -- , 93 N. E. (2d) 655 (1950), affirming 275 App. Div. 1042,
91 N. Y. S. (2d) 924 (1949), where it was held that proper and timely notice was
essential even though the minor, because of extreme youth, was incapable of
giving notice.
6 It should be noted that the time permitted for notice under Iil. Rev. Stat. 1949.
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 523, in property damage by mob violence cases, is fixed at thirty
days instead of the six-month period specified in the Cities and Villages Act for
other cases.
7 The reasoning used in the instant case could be carried over so as to require
that suits for personal injury caused by mob violence should be begun within one
year, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-10, for no specific limitation period is fixed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 515.
8 The imposition of civil liability on the municipal corporation in mob violence
cases bears evidence of a survival of the ancient penalties imposed for failure
to raise the hue and cry or to produce the slayer of a Norman. See Holdsworth,
Hist. Eng. Law, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 15 and 294; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng.
Law, Vol. 1, p. 88,. and Vol. 2, p. 578.
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OR

EQUIVALENT -

WHETHER TENDER OF PAYMENT BY A CERTIFIED CHECK IS LEGAL TENDER
OPTION TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE FOR CASH-The case of Marv. Mathes1 presented the Appellate Court for the Fourth District
with the necessity of ruling on a problem, resolved in many jurisdictions,'
but one never before decided in Illinois. Mathes had there given Margulus
,an option to purchase certain real estate at a stipulated price payable
"in cash." Margulus decided to exercise the option, so the parties agreed
to meet late on the last day of the option period to work out the details.
At this meeting, Mathes tendered a deed and Margulus tendered two certified checks aggregating the total purchase price. Mathes rejected the
tender, demanding cash as specified in the option and professing fear
that the banks on which the checks were drawn might fail before the checks
could be cashed. Margulus never tendered cash but instead, believing, that
he had made legal tender, brought suit for breach of contract. The trial
Jury returned a verdict for the amount of plaintiff's damages but a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was allowed. The Appellate Court affirmed that action, holding that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, money is to be regarded as the sole medium of
payment. It was said that an effective tender had to be made in money,
or that which by law passes for money, and that the payee had a right
to so demand, regardless of his motive. As a check, whether certified or
not, is not the equivalent of money in law, even though it may be a commonly used means by which cash may be obtained, the objection that no
legal tender had been made had to be sustained. The decision, as previously mentioned, finds no precedent in Illinois law but it is in harmony
with the view established in Harding v. Commercial Loan Company.
It was there decided that tender of an ordinary check would not be a
legal tender and could be defeated by objection on the part of the creditor.
The same view has now been taken as to a check which has been certified.
UNDER

4gulus

WILLS FECT OF

RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-

Wmow's

RENUNCIATION

EF-

OF WILL UPON SPECIFIC AND RESIDUARY

DEvIsEs-The facts in Gowling v. GowlingI disclose that the testator died
leaving the plaintiff as widow and a large number of collateral relatives,
defendants therein, as his heirs at law. The decedent left an estate con1 339 11.

App. 497, 90 N. E. (2d) 254 (1950).
2 See annotations in 51 A. L. R. 393 and 23 A. L. R. 1284.
8 84 Ill. 251 (1876).
1405 Ill. 165, 90 N. E. (2d) 188 (1950).
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sisting of a substantial amount of personal property and three tracts of
farm land. The testator's will provided that all of the real estate was to
be placed in trust with his widow and one of his nephews as trustees, the
widow to be entitled to receive the net income during her widowhood.
Upon termination of the trust, one parcel of land was to go to the nephew
who acted as trustee, a second was devised to a named grandnephew and
grandniece in equal parts, and the third was to be divided among the
remaining nephews and pieces, or their descendants, per stirpes and not
per capita. The widow, apparently dissatisfied with the provisions of the
will, filed her renunciation in proper time and elected to take her statutory share of the estate. 2 She later sought partition of all of the realty.
The specific devisees, by way of defense as to their parcels, argued that
the renunciation of the will by the widow should not operate to affect
them in any way and that her lawful share, as widow, should be taken
from the residuary estate. The lower court, however, following Section
16 of the present Probate Act,3 held that the widow was entitled to a onehalf interest in each item of real estate owned by the testator, including
therein the lands which had been specifically devised. On direct appeal
to the Supreme Court, a freehold being involved, that decision was affirmed.
The specific devisees placed reliance upon the holding in Pace v. Pace4
wherein the court had held that, where legacies and devises bad to be
abated on account of a renunciation by the widow, legacies and devises
of the same class were to be reduced proportionately, but if of different
classes, residuary legacies and devises had to be abated before specific
ones. The statute then in operation had provided that the widow, upon
renunciation, was entitled to "one-half of all the real and personal estate." 5 Since that decision, however, the legislature repealed the old statute6 and replaced it with the present provision, which uses the words
"one-half of each parcel of real estate" of which the testator died seized. 7
That section being clear and unambiguous and it being necessary to give
effect to the legislative intent expressed therein, the court arrived at the
only possible conclusion when it decided that prior cases were no longer
controlling. The potential effect of the instant case should, however, be
borne in mind, particularly since the case represents the first construction
which has been given to the substituted section since its adoption.
2

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 169.

Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168(b).
Ill. 114, 110 N. E. 878 (1915).
5 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, Ch. 41, § 12. Italics added.
6 Laws 1939, p. 4.
7 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168(b). Italics added.
3

4 271
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WITNESSES-COMPETBNcY-WHETHER
A DEFENDANT

OR NOT

BUT NOT SERVED WITH SUMMONS

NAMED

AS

IS TO BE REGARDED

AS

A

PERSON

RuLE-In the case
of Sanky v. Interstate Dispatch, Inc., the Appellate Court for the First
District was again called upon to interpret the meaning of the word
" "PARTY"

WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE DEAD MAN'S
1

"party"

as that term is contained in the so-called "Dead Man's" rule.The plaintiff therein had sued, in his capacity as administrator, to recover
for the wrongful death of his decedent arising out of a collision between
the plaintiff's automobile, driven by the decedent with plaintiff's permission, and a truck owned by the corporate defendant and driven by one
of its employees. The employee had been named as a co-defendant with
the corporate employer, but both the original and alias summons had been
returned "not found" as to him. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the
corporate defendant, at which time the employee was produced as an
occurrence witness to controvert the testimony of plaintiff's sole eyewitness. The employee was permitted to testify over plaintiff's objection that, being a party to an action brought by an administrator and not
having been dismissed from the cause, the employee's testimony was inadmissible under the aforementioned statute. From a verdict and judgment for the corporate defendant, plaintiff took an appeal, but the judgment was affirmed on the basis of the holding in Webb v. Willett Company.'
It had been there held that a co-defendant whose interest had been
finally determined by an unreversed judgment in his favor was, thereafter, no longer a "party" at a subsequent retrial of the action as to his
former co-defendant and could, accordingly, testify without objection. The
reasoning leading to that result was based on the proposition that a person is not, in legal contemplation, a "party" to an action unless he has
a right to be heard therein and to control the proceedings thereof, 4 so
that, once his interest has been determined, he ceases to have any right
of control and therefore ceases to be a "party" to the action.' Following that theory, the court in the instant case concluded that, as the employee in question had not been served nor had entered an appearance,
he had no right to be heard or to control the case in any manner, hence
1 339 Ill. App. 420, 90 N. E. (2d) 265 (1950).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2, directs that no "party to any civil

action, or person directly interested in the event, shall be allowed to testify
therein of his own motion, or in his own behalf, . . . when an adverse party sues
or defends as the . . . administrator . . . of any deceased person."

contains certain exceptions not here pertinent.
3 309 Ill. App. 504, 33 N. E. (2d) 636 (1941).
4 The court quoted Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, § 535.
5 See also Weaver v. Ritchie, 152 fI1. App. 130 (1909).

The statute

RECENT ILLINOIS CASES

was not a "party" within the provisions of the "Dead Man's" rule. It
would seem, therefore, that merely naming a person as defendant is insufficient to disqualify him as a witness and that disqualification does not
attach until there has been service of summonse or appearance, which disqualification will cease when there has been a final determination of his
interest.7

6 The plaintiff, in the instant case, made no attempt to serve the employee, with
summons when he appeared as a witness. Had plaintiff done so, a postponement
of the trial might have resulted but plaintiff's purpose would have been subserved.
7 Plaintiff also relied on the point that the employee was a person "directly
interested" in the outcome of the case, so as to be disqualified, even if he was not
to be considered a "party." That contention was rejected, except as to the point
that the fact of employment might be shown to affect credibility, on the basis of the
holding in Feitl v. Chicago City R. Co., 211 Ill. 279, 71 N. E. 991 (1904).

